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ANDREW BEATTY 
Kala defanged
Managing power in Java away from the centre
Introduction: Topographies of power
In the anthropology of power there is a complex interaction between events 
on the ground, models of those events constructed by actors (explanations 
and charters, models of and models for), and the perspectives of outsiders 
trying to make sense of it all. Edmund Leach (1954) was among the first to 
explore this nexus of idea and action in Political systems of Highland Burma, 
since when discussion – at least in Southeast Asian circles – has oscillated, 
Kachin-style, between the serene idealism of Clifford Geertz (1980) in Negara 
and pragmatically minded, transactional approaches of the kind exemplified 
by Fredrik Barth (1993) in Balinese worlds. 
Java has a place in this story. The turmoil of its history – its feuds and 
famines, conquests and colonizations – contrasts with its cultural emphasis on 
permanence, its refined rage for order. As Schrieke (1957) long ago showed, 
the continuity of Javanese history consists precisely in an emphasis on continu-
ity, each ruler assuming not simply the temporary reins of power, but its last-
ing symbols. However different their practical circumstances, however irregu-
lar their claims to authority, successive leaders saw and projected themselves 
as perpetuators of the old order (Moertono 1981:38, 52-3). Order depended 
on a conception of power as centralized, embodied in a ruler who was either 
semi-divine or linked to the gods. The ruler was a figure of both temporal and 
sacred authority, the pattern of behaviour for regional lords and the ultimate 
point of reference for the peasantry (Anderson 1990; Behrend 1989; Moertono 
1981). Power, in this conception, was not relational or abstract, but substantial, 
radiant, and magical. It operated through hierarchy. 
Whether we accept as the prime reality the image of continuity or the disor-
der it attempts to recover says much about our particular theoretical bent and 
style. The colonial-era scholars, Schrieke, De Graaf and Pigeaud, all empha-
sized continuities between the pre-Islamic and Islamic kingdoms, which con-
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sisted mainly in the forms and symbols of authority, the instruments of royal 
power. In a similar vein, the Javanese author Soemarsaid Moertono (1981:6) 
writes that over a period of ‘four hundred years [from its founding circa 1585, 
through its successor principalities, down to the present] no basic changes 
seem to have taken place in the structural organization of the Mataram state, 
nor in the ideological bases of state-life’. The idea is repeated by Benedict 
Anderson (1990:69) in his influential essay on the Javanese idea of power: 
‘Yet this overt Islamization of the rulers does not seem to have caused major 
alterations in their way of life or outlook. The penetration of Islam scarcely 
changed the composition and the recruitment of the Javanese political elite 
or affected the basic intellectual framework of traditional Javanese thought’. 
Whether they are speaking of politics, ‘way of life’, ‘world view’ or mysti-
cism, one thing that scholars agree upon is the extraordinary stability of what 
Moertono calls Java’s ‘conservative traditionalism’.1 
In the modern period, conservative traditionalism, in fetished form, typi-
fied the cultural politics of the Soeharto era (Pemberton 1994). Unlike earlier 
periods, known to us only from ruins and records, about this era we have a 
good deal more evidence: a better sense of the interweaving of refined words 
with violent actions and of the sometimes contradictory relations between 
‘exemplary centre and administrative periphery’ (Antlöv 1995). Yet the analy-
sis of power, fixated as it is on hegemonic structures, has continued to distract 
from other possibilities, other topographies of power.
Indeed, a top-down view of a top-down process necessarily misses a good 
deal, filtering out contrary evidence and fine detail. Rather like those func-
tionalist-era ethnographies of African societies where change was subsumed 
within a solid and enduring system underwritten by pax Britannica, theories 
of power in Java, if not quite a product of the 32-year Soeharto regime, came 
to reflect its rock-like permanence (or perhaps leech-like tenacity) and to 
emphasize structure, continuity, even timelessness, over material contingen-
cies and internal variations. The key to understanding Javanese thinking lay 
in the symbolism of the Indianized states and their Islamized epigones, king-
doms that came and went, changing little in essentials over a millennium. 
The great realms of Central and East Java stood for Java as a whole, and Java 
(or its Balinese cousin) for Indonesia and beyond (Geertz 1968, 1980). And if 
1 Two characteristic formulations: ‘[…] a world view and an ethos which is elitist, esoteric, 
and aesthetic, and which remains, even after the adaptations and reformulations forced upon it 
by four hundred years of Islamization, three hundred of colonial domination, and twenty of in-
dependence, a powerful theme in the contemporary Indonesian consciousness’ (Geertz 1968:36); 
‘a heterodox, radical union-mysticism, which the Javanese have held in tenacious, monotonous 
stability through long ages without essential change till the present day’ (Hadiwijono 1967:6). On 
the contrast between the ideological continuity and practical messiness of Javanese and Balinese 
history, see Ricklefs 1998. 
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idealized ‘theatre states’ – constructed, like castles in the air, over ‘exemplary 
centres’ – were best witnessed in Java and Bali (or at least pre-colonial Bali), 
they could be descried even in such unlikely places as modern, staunchly 
Muslim South Sulawesi (Errington 1989). Of course the model could only be 
maintained, like the polities they described, by ignoring a great deal of local 
reality – and, in the shape of Islam, quite a lot of non-local reality; or by hold-
ing to a view of politics as largely symbolic. Geertz (1980:131) had claimed 
of the Balinese negara that the king was ‘a sign in a system of signs’. Hardly 
changing the terms, Errington (1989:285) concludes: ‘One can reasonably 
regard the polity as a vast apparatus whose purpose was regulating signs, 
and the ruler as the ultimate source, ceiling, and regulator of signs’. 
The rhetorical force of the depiction made the arguments compelling.2 
Indeed, Anderson’s centrist Java and Geertz’s theatre state (surely one of 
the most dazzling anthropological productions) exerted such a spell that in 
Errington’s book one sometimes doubts whether the subject is Sulawesi or 
Java. In pulling in the ethnographic periphery, the charismatic thinkers had 
enacted their theories. 
Centres and outliers
If discussions of power in Indonesia have been too Java-centric, power talk 
about Java has been equally overcentralized. With the source of legitimacy 
located firmly in the centre – traditionally Jogja and Solo; in modern times 
Jakarta – outlying regions are stigmatized as powerful only in a negative way. 
At opposite ends of the island, Banten to the west and Banyuwangi in the east 
are notorious as ‘warehouses of black magic’. The reputation is self-fulfilling. 
It was Banyuwangi – in a horrible social experiment more risky to stage near 
the centres of command – that saw an outbreak of witch killings at the end of 
the Soeharto era when over one hundred people were lynched in the space of 
a few months. The victims were village healers, Koran teachers, vagrants, and 
unfriendly neighbours – people alike in their insignificance and marginality. 
That much was clear. But who was to blame? The killers, according to contra-
dictory reports, were local mobs or masked ninjas trucked in from outside. 
The instigators, according to rumour and inference, were Soeharto loyalists 
sowing the chaos that would justify a return to power, or Muslim extremists 
waging jihad against the infidel, or anti-Muslim extremists wanting to paint 
the orthodox parties as a threat to the secular compromise. Amid the talk of 
provocateurs and black propaganda, a surplus of theory contrasted with a 
dearth of reliable first-hand information. In a pattern that Bubandt (2001), 
2 For criticism, see Caldwell 1991; Howe 2005:32-7; Ricklefs 1992; Schulte Nordholt 1996. 
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writing of the Maluku wars, calls an ‘epidemic logic’, external factors – media 
reports, government directives and security warnings – fed local fears, shap-
ing the violence in unintended ways, as the spreading violence in turn con-
firmed the speculation. What Bubandt (2001:245) calls ‘political instigation 
theory’ – the dark side of centrist theories of power – ‘became the dominant 
discourse or narrative on the violence, both locally and nationally’. As is usu-
ally the case in Indonesian politics, no one knew for certain who was behind 
anything. Some have argued that there was no mastermind, no conspiracy. 
Others divined an existential crisis, a return of the repressed after decades of 
uneasy cultural truce (Siegel 2001). Herriman (2006, n.y.) shows in convinc-
ing detail that the witch hunt was motivated by local, relatively constant fac-
tors, its timing and virulence being a matter of opportunity as the state’s grip 
weakened. These views are not incompatible.
Most social scientists agree that a crisis of legitimacy accompanied a 
practical loss of control. Indeed, the classical Javanese model predicts that 
the collapse of centralized state power – in image or fact – is felt first in the 
regions where control is weakest (Anderson 1990:34-5). From this perspec-
tive, events in East Java were symptomatic of a bigger problem. And as the 
Banyuwangi lynchings faded, other conflicts depending on quite different 
local motivations – religious, ethnic, economic – broke out in regions far from 
Java. Undeniably, normal service between centre and periphery had been 
disrupted. The analogy that springs to mind is that of a power cut in which 
stray cable ends flicker and burst into flame. But were other conceptions of 
power – autochthonous, non-hierarchical – and different frames of action also 
in play? Did regime change expose alternative, deeper-lying models that had 
been suppressed by the heavy hand of New Order governance?
Behind the efforts to assign causes and apportion blame lie older unre-
solved doubts over the extent to which outliers, within and beyond Java, ever 
subscribed to the centrist model. Caldwell (1991) effectively disposes of one 
example, showing that none of the criteria – Indianization, borderless realms, 
an indifference to territorial control, ‘the idea of social and cosmic unity’, in 
short, the exemplary centre – ever applied in South Sulawesi. But what of 
those ‘other Javas away from the kraton’, where people speak, act, eat, cre-
ate, even carry things, differently (Hatley 1984)? These regional differences 
betoken not merely cultural variations on themes, but structural differences: 
breaches in the island pattern that once again became visible as Jakarta’s sun 
dimmed. 
Discussion of the causes of violence shortly before Soeharto’s fall and in 
the aftermath has polarized around two positions which differ fundamentally 
on the practical relation between centre and periphery. One camp argues that 
the violence was directed from the centre; the other that it flared because the 
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centre could not hold.3 Aditjondro (2001), for example, provides evidence 
of elite support for paramilitary fighters in Maluku, whereas Van Klinken 
(2006:134) stresses the ‘fundamentally local’ character of the violence in the 
outer islands, rejecting ‘Jakarta-centric’ explanations that regional conflicts 
were engineered to legitimize military intervention.
For obvious reasons, social scientists, and in particular anthropologists, 
have been keener than political scientists on local explanations. They are less 
concerned with policy; they talk to different kinds of people. But as recent 
scholarship has reminded us, the muddying of centre-periphery relations is 
far from new. Among elements that complicate the centrist model one can 
point to the legacy of state repression from colonial times (Schulte Nordholt 
2002), official connivance at gangsterism (Schulte Nordholt 2002; Frederick 
2002), and local traditions of rough justice that challenge the state’s monop-
oly on violence (Colombijn 2002; Herriman 2006; Siegel 2001). An emerging 
picture of the government as criminal – not merely venal and violent but 
illegitimate – undermines the very idea of cultural hegemony that has been 
scholarly orthodoxy since Anderson.
Order and consensus
Now, it is not very often that one can put one’s finger on the beginning of 
anything as nebulous as a witch craze, but I was lucky or unlucky enough to 
be living a couple of miles from the first killing at the end of 1996. Not know-
ing that hundreds more deaths would follow, I took no more notice of it than 
anyone else. The pattern seemed familiar: a reputed sorcerer, a bad neighbour 
lynched by villagers, a botched enquiry, a failure to convict that amounted to 
a semi-official condoning of the act. It had happened before. When a neigh-
bour broke the story of the killing, I was sitting with the headman of Bayu 
and other villagers around the remains of a slametan, a prayer-meal. Our in-
formant had been working as a carpenter in the hill village of Kenjo where he 
had relatives and got the story himself the morning after it happened. He was 
convinced of the victim’s evildoing and thought he had got what he deserved. 
He used the term rizik, ‘cleansing’, recalling the anti-communist purges of the 
1960s and the ‘mysterious killings’ of 1983 when gangsters and local trouble-
makers were executed by death squads. As the imam of our neighbourhood 
prayer-house, his words carried a certain weight. ‘These things may not be 
denied, may not be disbelieved’, he said. But the others present disagreed. 
3 Arguments about whether state agents or shadowy forces loyal to the old regime were the 
key factors seem to me beside the point in this respect. The regime always operated backstage to 
enforce the harmony that conductor and orchestra magically achieved onstage. What is at issue is 
whether local strife was engineered or home-grown.
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The headman said there was no such thing as sorcery. The reason why so 
many people died in Kenjo had nothing to do with sorcery. It was because 
it was backward, resistant to modern ways. If people didn’t foul the stream 
they drank from they wouldn’t get sick. Another man said that if anyone de-
served retribution it was the lynch mob: through the law of karma they would 
surely get their desserts. He himself had been a member of an Algojo death 
squad in 1965 and had since repented. And then they turned to me, in one of 
those agonizing fieldwork moments, and asked what I thought. I had heard 
a lot about the people who had died in Bayu in 1965, identified as sorcerers 
or communists – what they called pengiwo, figures of the left, the sinister, the 
dark side; I knew their widows and their children, and I said, No, the man 
was not a sorcerer and his killers were murderers. The headman was pleased. 
The imam-carpenter shook his head. The point could not be argued: this was 
Java. But he later banned his children from playing with mine.
Now I do not want to suggest that the witch killings were a result of reli-
gious factionalism or ideological divisions of the kind that were rife in the 
1960s. Herriman’s exhaustive forensic investigation has conclusively shown 
that not to be the case. People were victimized because of sorcery fears and 
personal grudges not obviously connected with cultural or class schisms; a 
weakened state allowed their violent expression.4 What I want to show with 
my anecdote is how local arrangements in ideologically plural villages like 
Bayu depend on consensus rather than a top-down cultural hegemony for 
the maintenance of order. A ‘Things fall apart/The centre cannot hold’ argu-
ment would miss this crucial point. In Banyuwangi there never was a centre. 
Instead, what permits daily life to go on in a village of orthodox Muslims, 
pantheist mystics, peasant animists and the religiously indifferent is a truce 
that allows people of different orientation to combine in ritual and in ordinary 
living arrangements. Far from the centres of political authority, what sustains 
the social order, what gives legitimacy to a plurality of views and practices, 
is a social contract realized in a hundred daily usages and sanctified in the 
slametan (Beatty 1999:23-50). The clash of opinions over the first witch killings, 
voiced in – of all places – a neighbourhood slametan, opened up a crack, forcing 
people to confront what divided them. When one man says ‘This may not be 
disbelieved’ and another says ‘I don’t believe in sorcery, the lynch mob were 
murderers’, this makes it difficult to carry on. My own little difficulty was that 
4 Herriman n.y., 2006. Local, even routine, motivations do not exclude the possibility that the 
witch craze embodied paranoid fears and unarticulated anxiety over the dead of 1965, as Siegel 
(2001) suggests in a fascinating essay. Siegel (2001:31, 57) is incorrect, however, in seeing witch-
craft in Banyuwangi as something inherent or ‘inherited’ (like Evans-Pritchard’s Azande), as 
opposed to learned or passed on. Nor is witchcraft/sorcery (synonyms in Siegel’s presentation 
(2001:37, 46, 56)) regarded as a form of spirit possession. Neither the witch nor the victim is pos-
sessed in any sense that Javanese would recognize. 
 Kala defanged 179
my children were deprived of their best friend for a month. But the headman, 
shortly after the encounter, faced a concerted challenge to his authority from 
Muslim militants in a coup that had been building for a year or more (Beatty 
2009). The important point is that he held on; the militants were faced down; 
and unlike many other villages in the surrounding countryside, Bayu suffered 
no witch hunt. The old consensual arrangements stood it in good stead. 
Tanah sabrang wetan: Power beyond the eastern frontier
The failed village coup, like the witch killings, throws a lurid light on the ways 
in which power is managed away from the centre, in places where potency 
and politics are separate matters. In the Banyuwangi area the distinction goes 
back a long way. As a realm loosely affiliated to Majapahit, later a rebellious 
vassal of Mataram, at times a Balinese ally, Blambangan in Java’s Eastern Cape 
was ambiguously placed: neither a province nor independent, Javanese but 
self-avowedly different (Lekkerkerker 1923). It remained a Hindu-Buddhist 
realm for 250 years after Majapahit fell, retaining to this day a dialect with 
many words from Old Javanese and Balinese and a distinctive – probably 
post-conquest – ethnic badge: Osing, or Jawa Osing. Islam became the official 
religion of its puppet rulers, at Dutch insistence, only after the VOC had practi-
cally wiped out the population in the 1760s (Lekkerkerker 1923:1048-54). But 
villages around Banyuwangi remained buda into the mid-nineteenth century, 
350 years after the rest of Java (Lekkerkerker 1923:1030). Resistance to Muslim 
rule is recorded in folk memory (Pigeaud 1932:249). When, in the seventeenth 
century, the local strongman sent his court magician and guru to Mataram, 
there was a trial of strength. The Mataram adviser asked for the guru’s kris, 
then dissolved it in water and swallowed it. Not to be outdone, the guru spoke 
a buda mantra and called for his kris to return, which it did, bursting through 
the Mataram adviser’s stomach and flying back to its owner’s sheath. Every 
year, that ‘same’ kris undergoes a rigorous cleansing at the sage’s shrine in 
Cungking in a ritual which is part of a priestly cult unapologetically free of 
Islamic elements. The cult’s heirlooms include a zodiac beaker, probably Maj-
apahit-era, of the kind still used in the Tengger highlands to the west (Zodiak-
bekers 1921:861-2). Other relics of the same semi-legendary figure are scattered 
among half a dozen villages. In annual cleansing rituals they are handled rev-
erently by ordinary Muslims and questioned for prophecy.
What is interesting is that broader Hindu-Javanese connections are forgot-
ten, so the saint’s cult presents no explicit challenge to Muslim orthodoxy or 
the official dominance of Islam. The same applies to the ingredients of local 
syncretic culture: the making of holy water, the mumbled mantras, the colour 
symbolism of the slametan that matches the iconography of fourteenth-cen-
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tury Java.5 Sometimes identified as Wangsakarya, the guru of Tawang Alun 
(reign 1676-1691), most people know the sage simply as Great-grandfather 
Cungking. Indeed, the buda champion has been reinvented as a purely local 
hero. In local conception, the zodiac figures on the beaker refer to the lords 
of illness that preside over 12 sacred spots around the area. The cult’s most 
secret and powerful knowledge is a litany of the 12 lords to be recited as you 
revolve the beaker on your left hand during the annual cleansing. The content 
of the cult’s teaching, such as it is, consists of standard Javanist axioms about 
self-control, self-knowledge, and the interconnectedness of microcosm and 
macrocosm – no bismillahs, then, but nothing to frighten the horses. The pro-
phetic power of the relics is pretty bland too: a matter of celebrants interpret-
ing the letters on a copper inscription. Since the letters are worn out by centu-
ries of fingering, the meaning changes, rewritten every year like a palimpsest. 
But to the cult’s adherents, instruction and prophecy matter less than the fact 
of participation in an openly non-Islamic cult that is still a legitimate part of 
the local syncretism. For the saint is also the guardian spirit of the village, and 
the headman cannot govern without his approval, vested in the cult’s elders. 
Weekly sessions at the shrine in Cungking are mostly attended by Javanists, 
people whose attachment to formal Islam is secondary. But the bigger events 
attract large numbers of orthodox traditionalist Muslims.
Here, then, is a localized source of power, remote from formal authority 
though underpinning its lowest elected functionary, distinct from the domi-
nant religion yet complementing it in practice. In two other villages close to 
Banyuwangi, major non-Islamic rituals remain central to village life. In the 
seblang trance dance of Bakungan, an old woman incarnates local spirits and 
dances for two hours, enacting the first clearing of the forest and planting of 
rice. The dance is incorporated in the slametan desa, the annual village feast. 
I witnessed this performance on three occasions in the 1990s and was told 
by the organizers that the headman’s relation to the seblang was like that of 
the Sultan of Jogja with Ratu Kidul, spirit queen of the Southern Ocean. The 
headman of the time, a Christian, was unhappy with his ritual consort. ‘I’m 
already married,’ he protested. But when he tried to stop the event one year 
he fell ill and was obliged to relent. For the dukun who summons the spirits, 
Islam is, as he put it, ‘a colonization of the soul’, a foreign import that he 
rejects as a Javanese. The seblang, for him, is part of Java’s buda heritage. But 
most other villagers see no conflict between the seblang and their affiliation 
to Islam. Similarly, in the village of Olehsari, another seblang dance, this time 
5 Pigeaud 1962, IV:57-8. Nor does the iconography contain any political referent: it is self-con-
tained. The litany accompanying the neighbourhood slametan refers to the self as microcosm, not 
to the ruler or polity (Beatty 1999). This lack of a wider political context contrasts with the parallel 
that Headley found between state and village rituals and with the shared cosmology of king and 
peasantry in Central Java (Headley 2000:193-6). 
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performed by a young girl, is the main event of the ritual calendar (Wessing 
1999). In an effort to bring it within the fold of Islam, it was moved from after 
the harvest to Idul Fitri, but its non-Islamic character is otherwise unchanged. 
As its organizers proudly proclaim, ‘No bismillahs here’. In 1996 the young, 
ambitious headman – always in uniform, not terribly bright – saw it as a 
branch of village security (keamanan) rather than a challenge to orthodoxy. 
But despite the efforts of cultural bureaucrats to turn it into a tourist attrac-
tion or a mere cultural performance, it escapes political domestication.
Alternative models of power
So what kind of power is being channelled here? In Varieties of Javanese religion 
(Beatty 1999), I referred to Turner’s concept (1969) of the ‘powers of the weak’, 
the appropriation of spiritual powers by disadvantaged groups to offset their 
political weakness. A similar notion was developed by Lewis (1971) in his 
studies of women’s possession cults in East Africa. In such cases the strength 
of the marginalized, the efficacy of their magic – in political terms, the bite of 
the underdog – depends upon a shared recognition of chthonic or immanent 
powers. Turner traced this recognition to the liminal phase of ritual in which 
status differences are set aside in favour of a common humanity felt to be in 
the protection of the unmarked group: the maternal relatives in a patrilineal 
system, the people without status or formal position. What about Java? Away 
from the palace and the barracks, with their monopoly on might and magic, 
such practices can still flourish. Indeed, the traditionalist Islam followed in 
rural Banyuwangi is no threat to them. What would exclude the traffic with 
spirits – and deny the powers of the weak – is, rather, a rationalized, modern-
ist monotheism that would banish them from its worldview.
The distinction between sacred power and political authority can be seen 
at its starkest in the Barong show of Bayu, an all-night drama that climaxes at 
dawn in a spirit possession by a were-tiger (macan). The barong is the village 
mascot, pet dragon of Bayu’s guardian spirit; the drama in which he features 
is a central institution of village life; yet most of the 26 players – the musi-
cians, clowns, princes and ape-monsters – are from families stigmatized by 
association with the outlawed communist party. The man who is possessed 
by the tiger spirit and who bears its mask witnessed as a boy the murder 
of his father by anti-communist vigilantes acting at the behest of regional 
military commanders. The disjunction between spirit power and body poli-
tic could hardly be sharper. Seeing the macan run riot through the terrified 
crowd it is hard not to wonder: what is going on inside the head of the man 
inside the head? And whose power is it anyway?
You might think its tainted past would put the Barong beyond the pale of 
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respectability. But the tiger-spirit is also the village guardian: the spirit-posses-
sion is part of the annual cleansing. Here then, we have a paradox: the welfare 
of the village maintained by political pariahs, people with an unspeakable past.
It would be a mistake simply to see the Barong as an example of ‘resis-
tance’. Its sanctity, its stubborn refusal to be improved by tourist promoters 
or manipulated by local politicians, is certainly a kind of defiance. But its 
place within the ensemble of village activities, like that of the trance dances 
and the Cungking cult, is neither oppositional nor partisan. Nor do people 
see it that way. What all these performances fiercely resist is their suppres-
sion, but that is a different matter.
We can come to an understanding of what is going on by recognizing that 
the form and the location of power differ from the classical model in which 
sacred power and authority coincide (or are made to coincide through the 
ritual validation of force). Indeed, several conceptions of power are present in 
the same setting. To be sure, it is possible to find traces of the classical model 
in local politics, for example, in the practice of staying up on the night of a 
village election to see who will be anointed, as indicated by the daru, the ball 
of divine radiance that falls like a star on the roof of the favoured candidate 
– a practice that recalls in miniature the alighting of wahyu, or divine grace, 
on the king’s successor (Moertono 1981:56). Practically, this custom puts the 
power of prophecy and therefore of patronage in the hands of the skywatch-
ers: the headman has to win their approval. In the run-up to an election, 
villages around Banyuwangi hold divination sessions at which readings are 
taken from the lontar Yusup, a seventeenth-century Javanese narrative of the 
Life of Joseph.6 At the end of the all-night recitation, the book is smoked in 
incense and, one by one, the names of the candidates are put to the test. The 
diviner lets the book fall open and reads the lines on facing pages between 
his thumbs. The dozen or so elders who have sat up and recited then debate 
the meaning. Since the words are taken out of context (you may not refer to 
the lines above or below) and the two lines are unrelated to each other, the 
meaning is necessarily obscure, and therefore has to be sifted. It is particular 
words or phrases rather than whole sentences that matter.
In the village of Bayu, one such divination yielded the following combina-
tion of words when the candidate Sutris was put to the test:
Pangeran tumurun bagindha, Dawud ingkang ngebaktia ring ingsun iku maleh 
sun kasmaran7 
6 For a comprehensive treatment of the Lontar Yusup, see Arps 1992. 
7 The words do not scan as a single sentence since they combine unconnected lines from facing 
pages. I am grateful to Ben Arps for his advice on the transcriptions and translations. (The interpre-
tations, in places unorthodox, are those of my informants.) The divination procedure described in 
Arps’ book (1992:175) had changed in the few years that separated our periods of research.
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The phrase pangeran tumurun bagindha indicated princely descent, seemingly 
authorizing the appointment. The name Dawud, in the anthropocentric sym-
bolism of the lontar, means voice, suwara, which also means ‘vote’. Kasmaran 
(enamoured) ‘meant’ seneng, pleased, glad. The elders agreed that a highborn 
ancestral headman called Kepundung was speaking through the lontar and 
giving candidate Sutris the nod. 
In contrast, the divination for his rival, the son of a former headman, 
indicated the end of a chiefly line, as shown by the words ‘death’ and ‘scat-
tered’. The results of these ancestrally guided readings are noted down and 
preserved in beautiful calligraphy, sometimes framed, and preserved as 
powerful testimonies. When I asked, ‘What if Sutris, in the event, hadn’t been 
elected?’, they said: ‘He must, because the reading is a revelation of what 
must happen’. And they pointed to the line that says, Sadurunge winarah, wus 
wikan: ‘Before being told, he/they already know.’
It is important to note that the divination can only be done after a full read-
ing at which the beginning is reread, completing a narrative circle, just as the 
book goes round from reader to reader. And the interpretation is decided by 
consensus, not by an authoritative expert. The legitimation of the headman is 
therefore collective, anticipating the proof of the falling star. The readers stay 
up all night in what is called a malem tirakat, a night of mystical austerity, as it 
were accumulating and embodying the power to give voice to the prophecy.
What the collective deliberations do not fully express, any more than the 
complex litany of the neighbourhood slametan, is the esoteric meaning or 
level of insertion of the symbols, what Javanese call their location, lungguh. 
This is because readers differ in their orthodoxy and knowledge: some of 
them being pious Muslims who do the daily prayers and believe in the literal 
prophecy of Muhammad, others being pantheists or even atheists who see 
the Koran and the Prophet as no more or less than human symbols.
For the mystics, the lontar is an instrument of self-reflection, not a window 
onto the otherworld, the world of spirits, which is purely symbolic. Nor is it a 
factual narration of Egyptian history. As they constantly told me, ‘there is no 
need to go outside’. Lontar, in their obsessive wordplay is lantaran, a ‘media-
tor’ in the reading of the self.
All of these performances – the trance dance, the tiger possession, the lon-
tar reading – are sacred rituals before they are entertainments. As such, they 
cannot be tampered with. They provide access to, and showcase, power. The 
ritual context provides the insulating ‘container’ (wadah); collective participa-
tion authorizes the ritual’s form. The notion of container and contained is, 
of course, a standard one in Javanese thinking; but, as we shall see, it has a 
particular resonance in an area remote from centralized political rule, for here 
sacred potency lacks the protective envelope of legitimate authority; contain-
ment and concentration must take on different forms. 
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Power and place: An alternative model
After the Dutch conquest of Blambangan in the late 1760s, there was no func-
tioning court subordinate to the foreign ruler such as those of Yogya or Solo, 
no palace or aristocratic class to maintain the semblance of sovereignty or 
the pattern of behaviour.8 The situation was quite unlike that described by 
Headley (2000:196) for Central Java in which ruler and villager inhabited a 
‘jointly envisioned cosmos’ and the peasant acknowledged his place within 
a hierarchy (see also Keeler 1985). Power, as locally conceived, lacked a so-
cial focus, a living epitome. Without the centripetal pull of the royal rituals, 
without the taxes and temple networks that provided both hierarchical frame 
and practical means elsewhere in Java, there was nothing – no court-country 
polarity – to hold things together (Hall 1999:215-29; De Casparis and Mabbett 
1999:304-17). Since there was no exemplary centre, power was – and is – dis-
persed among sacred locations (angker) – mountain tops and craters, ruins 
and caves – and among semi-historical figures (wong sakti) and their shrines 
mythically connected to the old order. Access is controlled by dukun, caretak-
ers and mystics able to tap the circuits and manipulate the relics for contem-
porary meanings.
In the centralizing classical model, power is at once focused and radiant, 
attractive and expansive – in the imagery of its exponents, a lens, lamp, or 
torch (Anderson 1990; Moertono 1981). Away from the centre, the topog-
raphy of power is differently structured. Here we find a less explicit model 
composed of scattered, self-contained powerpoints. These sacred emanations 
may be connected up in local legend or linked through the wanderings of 
saints and sages: such is the case with the Twelve Lords of the Cungking cult. 
Or they subsist as isolates, effusions that cannot be brought within an over-
arching narrative unless it be that of the pantheist mystics, for whom power 
is as singular as it is pervasive (Beatty 2009:151-64, 188-99).
For this alternative model of power, metaphors of torches or lamps will 
not do. One thinks instead of the fashionable image of the rhizome: haphaz-
ard connection without hierarchy or centre; or the secret tunnels, reported by 
George Quinn (2004), that link powerpoints across Java. I have not heard of 
these tunnels in Banyuwangi, but the notion of subterranean networks, subtly 
undermining surface hierarchies, is an apt one for the inchoate model I am 
outlining. Against the top-down, hierarchical vision of a cosmic mountain or 
8 A remnant lives on in Banyuwangi, jealously preserving its titles but without power or privi-
lege (De Stoppelaar 1927:20). To the extent that they are known in the hinterland villages, their 
standing depends on reputed connections with semi-legendary figures of the pre-colonial past. 
At the time of my fieldwork in the 1990s, a retired plantation supervisor – an aristocratic scion – 
kept the family graveyard. 
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omphalos, with the king at its centre, picture a hidden Java shaped to local 
impulses, honeycombed from within.
Blambangan, whose volcanic landscape is riddled with powerpoints, was 
a place of exile, its plantations worked by colonial convicts, its forests and 
mountains the haunt of dynastic rebels and malcontents fleeing Mataram and 
Bali. Among the aristocratic spirits of Alas Purwo (Primeval Forest) on the 
Eastern Cape is Joyokusumo, the founder of Sangkan Paran, a mystical sect 
with a large following in the region. As he entered the forest for the first time, 
Joyokusumo is said to have peeled off his human mask to reveal a tiger with-
in: a trope that joins the liminal status of the were-tiger to the unruly energy 
of the exile. To members of the sect, the mystical tiger-spirit recalls an earlier 
legend – the charter myth of Blambangan’s golden age. Before he challenged 
Mataram and struck out for independence, Tawang Alun first withdrew to 
the forest where he saw a vision of the white tiger (macan putih) that would 
carry him to the place where he would found his new capital, Macan Putih.
Like the forest sprites and demons of the Barong drama, noble spirits are 
sources of power unrecognized in official discourses. With their seats (lung-
guh) in wild places – groves, crags, ruins – they harbour an untamed potency 
that can be converted into hegemony only through rebellion, usurpation or 
the millennial coming of the Just King, the ratu adil. One of the epithets of the 
Sangkan Paran founder, to be found in a litany in the member’s handbook, is 
Erucakra, a messianic title he shares with that epitome of displaced potency, 
Prince Dipanagara. His shrine in a village to the west of Banyuwangi contains 
a repository of relics, including ‘Dipanagara’s gown’.
The boundary of power
In the classical Javanese model of statecraft, the ruler claimed to be the axis of 
the world – not just a hotline to the gods but the point of intersection between 
the microcosm of the realm and the godly macrocosm (Moertono 1981). Af-
ter Blambangan was decapitated and laid waste by the VOC, the concentric 
model could not apply. Sacred power lurked in the forests, among diehard 
rebels and priests loyal to the old order (Lekkerkerker 1923; Pigeaud 1932). 
But they too were rooted out or sent into exile. Modern Banyuwangi is the 
legacy of this history.
Without centre or periphery, the problem of accumulation and contain-
ment of sacred power takes a different form. Anderson’s model has a radiant 
centre but no perimeter: power simply fades with distance, like the signal 
from a telephone mast. Ironically, all that remains of the last kingdom in 
Blambangan is part of its wall: a perimeter without a centre. Post-conquest 
another model is emphasized. Power is kept from slipping away not by cen-
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tripetal ritual but by inscribing a temporary boundary. In all of the examples I 
have given, before local spirits are channelled, the participants first construct 
a boundary, either by ritually walking round a territory, constructing a fence 
or enclosure, or verbally marking off a perimeter, as in the litany of the 12 
lords on the zodiac beaker or the circuit of lontar readings (the readers, in 
turn, are enclosed within a fence of woven leaves). As with everything else, 
the relation of content to container is itself subject to diverse cultural elabo-
ration. The container, wadhah, is – for Javanists – the material (wadhag) form 
holding the more precious ethereal content. If the wrapper is Islamic, as in the 
prayers framing a slametan, the higher truth is contained in the kernel, which 
is always in the vernacular, not Arabic. The more orthodox, on the other 
hand, tend to relativize the content or interpret its symbols in Islamic terms. 
The lontar recitation seems on the face of it a plainly Islamic occasion. But 
the concealed meanings, unavailable to the orthodox (or unacknowledged), 
are anthropocentric and universal. In the same way, for the mystics the true 
source of knowledge is not the Koran, which is time-bound and historical, 
but the living human body – the ‘wet book’ – endlessly reproduced through 
the generations. In this East Javanese, literally eccentric, perspective, the fixed 
orientation of, and to, the palace no longer applies. Microcosm and macro-
cosm join not in the single person of the ruler, but in any individual able to 
read the symbols or scan the book of the self. The fixed cosmic order, so cru-
cial to classical statecraft, gives way to a relativist anthropocentric universe, a 
kind of ‘wherever I hang my hat’ philosophy. 
 More at home in Java’s Eastern Cape, the metaphysical free agent is none-
theless a latent threat in regions closer to the centres of traditional authority. 
Indeed, for Keeler (1992:10), the pursuit of potency through self-isolation 
is linked to notions of autonomy. Once obtained, however, potency must 
be acknowledged to remain effective: the challenger needs a following, the 
dhalang an audience (Keeler 1992:19; Moertono 1981:79). Moreover, the pos-
sibility of withholding one’s attention or transferring allegiance ‘undermines 
the potency of any one center, and so undercuts the potency of the exemplary 
center’ (Keeler 1985:139). The instability of power, its dependence on attrac-
tion not coercion, grants an efficacy to the formally powerless; top-down 
ideology is vulnerable to popular withdrawal.9
‘In the traditional setting,’ writes Paul Stange (1999:240), ‘mystical con-
sciousness and social power were cosmologically bound together.’ In the 
Banyuwangi-based Sangkan Paran sect, whose ideas are interwoven with 
local religious practices, notions of microcosm and macrocosm, expressed in a 
9 A reviewer comments: ‘[in Central Java] people are always on the lookout for signs as to the 
waning of a current center and so the seeds of disorder are always present. Kethoprak stories are 
full of this sort of thing.’
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politically correct formula linking the ‘order of the state’ (tata negara) with the 
orders of household and person, are balanced by a countervailing emphasis 
on self-containment and the individual realization of spiritual potency (in the 
sect’s jargon, kuwasa). Stange identifies a separation of the magical from the 
mystical, a ‘shift of emphasis from powers to consciousness’ in post-colonial 
Javanese mysticism. In Sangkan Paran’s case, this shift is not just a reckon-
ing with modernity or an acknowledgement of political realities; it restates a 
vernacular rejection of the centrist model, affirming the universal in the local.
For the mystics, then, power is personalized. For the rest, it emerges in 
performance – theatrically and violently, but guaranteed by a tradition that 
is itself dependent on a living consensus, a joining of unlike-minded souls in 
the social compact. This is not Durkheimian organic solidarity, but a kind of 
horses-for-courses ecumenism that accommodates difference by specializa-
tion and an agreement not to contest meanings in public. For lack of a centre, 
cohesion is achieved by other means. And in the intricate symbolism of the 
slametan it all comes together.
One might argue that the frozen politics of the Soeharto era, like the pax 
Neerlandica, favoured and fostered this ritual and social compromise. But the 
compromise preceded the dictatorship and outlasted it; it was maintained in 
spite of state-sponsored violence and political repression.
Placing power
Javanese visitors to rural Banyuwangi, like colonial observers before them (De 
Stoppelaar 1927:21, 115), are struck by its egalitarian ethos and – in the Osing-
majority villages – the almost complete lack of speech levels or formal indi-
cators of status. To these unusual features we can add other characteristics 
unwitnessed by earlier observers: its fluid social patterns, its flirting with com-
petition and chaos in traditional contests, its internal diversity and the complex 
cultural compromises that prevent conflict (Beatty 2005). The temptation is to 
explain these regional peculiarities as either adventitious historical residues or 
the effects of some unchanging cultural essence. But they possess both a long 
history and the sanction of tradition. And seen in the light of the problematic of 
this article – power away from the centre – they take on a certain logic. Banyu-
wangi is what it is because of where it is. Its place within the bigger picture, its 
dislocation, is crucial. Can the same be said, perhaps, of other outliers?
I have said that the work of interpretation is very much concerned with 
locating meanings: in texts, in the body, in puns and allusions. This is com-
mon to all Javanese interpretation. But Banyuwangi is especially concerned 
with place: being in and out of place, changing places, and so on (Beatty 
2002). With no fixed fount of power, space becomes highly relativized and 
188	 Andrew	Beatty
unstable; even the cardinal directions are given anthropocentric – hence 
shifting – origin (Beatty 1999:162-3). What matters for order, and thus for the 
containment of power, is the orderly management of movement. A change of 
place within the structure implies a potentially dangerous release of power, 
but provided this can be contained within a ritual form, it can be beneficent, 
life-giving. At the seven-month pregnancy ritual, for example, husband and 
wife change places, the woman squirting porridge into the husband’s cupped 
hands. He provides the womb-container, she the seed.
Weddings climax, amid the thunder of drums, in a curious little ritual in 
which bride and groom scrabble for seeds tipped out of a bag and then pull 
either end of a leaf packet (kupat). The two actions mime the spreading of seed 
– a ritual ejaculation – and release from a vow symbolized by the unravelling 
of the empty packet. Content without container is replaced by a container 
without content. The life-giving rhythm of spilling and release is enacted 
within the safety of a ritual wrapper.
The same highly charged unravelling occurs in the Barong show when the 
were-tiger breaks free of his bonds prior to possessing the man-in-the-mask. 
And ritual unravelling completes the exorcistic shadow play which tells the 
story of the Birth of Kala. In his erudite studies of cosmology, Stephen Headley 
(2000, 2005) has reconstructed the evolution of the Kala myth and its changing 
place in what he calls the Central Javanese ‘landscape of faith’.10 In Headley’s 
analysis, a holism rooted in the old kingdoms and personified in the monarch 
has given way to a rival worldview whose centre is Mecca and whose con-
stituency is the amorphous umat. Islam’s ‘transposable landscape of belief’ is 
inhabited by an uprooted peasantry now prey to individualism and nostalgic 
for the lost whole (Headley 2005:517). But in Banyuwangi, as we have seen, 
Islam made its accommodations in a very different way and in a quite different 
setting. In places such as Bayu, among villagers of mixed orientation, the con-
cept of the umat can only be divisive. Until recently, with the Islamic revival, it 
was rarely used. In two years’ fieldwork I only heard the word used by visiting 
preachers. In Bayu, the ties between co-religionists complement rather than 
challenge the horizontal bonds of kinship and neighbourhood; and at the very 
edge of Java there was no centralized hierarchy to replace or bring down. Kala 
stalks an altogether different landscape. Indeed, differences in the topography 
of power help to account for the special appeal of his story.
As in the wedding rite, in the Birth of Kala we again find a miming of spill-
ing and freeing. The god Guru (Siwa) chases his consort, fails to catch her (or 
– seated behind her on an ox – cannot connect) and spills his sperm into the 
ocean, thus unleashing evil and death upon the world. Guru’s semen causes 
a boiling of the ocean from which a monster, Kala, the source of misfortune, 
10 Alternative East Javanese wayang versions are outlined in Clara van Groenendael 1992. 
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is born. Mary Douglas (1966) famously defined pollution as matter out of 
place. Guru’s spilled seed is, supremely, matter out of place, the original sin 
for which all humans must pay. As the god Narada explains to Guru, ‘this all 
started because you chose the wrong time and place’ (Headley 2000:39). But 
the offending material is not simply out of place but lacking a receptacle, a 
wadhah. The performance of the play is the solution to this problem.
For reasons which should now be clear, the very idea of spilt seed – dis-
placed power – makes the play highly appropriate for Banyuwangi; indeed 
the Birth of Kala is said, by tradition, to be the only wayang regularly per-
formed in the area. The dangerous power unleashed by the randy god, is 
domesticated, made safe by the puppeteer. Kala’s fangs are extracted and 
his powers over the lare wayang – the children whose birth combinations are 
inauspicious, people out of place – are dissolved by the recitation of sacred 
mantras. The sponsors of the show, or their children who have been hexed 
by Kala, gather beneath the puppet screen and pull the ends of an empty leaf 
packet, freeing themselves from Kala’s influence.
But power, its containment and orderly release, depend, as I have said, on 
consensus. You may disagree, but once you do so in public you breach the 
protective fence, the container, and power runs riot. So it did in 1998 with the 
fall of Soeharto. In the year before that Year of Living Dangerously, I recorded 
another of those oddly humorous little rituals that mark the milestones in 
Java. Two boys about to undergo circumcision were dikalani, that is rid of 
Kala’s baneful influence, by having their hairline shaved and a cock’s blood 
tipped over their heads. It was a splicing together of opposites: a head-cir-
cumcision, a buda exorcism joined to an Islamic rite of passage. The master of 
ceremonies was the modin, the mosque official. He wore a trilby hat to show 
he was off-duty and a smile to show that it was all harmless fun, no stain on 
his official orthodoxy. But the boys’ father, a reformist zealot and critic of the 
modin, had objected to the performance. Under pressure he let it happen. It 
was this man – an ally of the imam-carpenter – who later led the village coup 
against the secularist headman and enthusiastically backed the witch killings. 
For him and the growing number who are like him, Islam has ceased to be a 
mere container of Javanism. Indeed the metaphor no longer applies. A puri-
fied Islam needs no Javanist purifications.
Yet amid the Islamic revival, the shows go on: the seblang, the tiger posses-
sions, the spirit cults, the lontar. In a context of overheated cultural politics, 
Kala’s defanging – the ritual containment of power – comes to assume a 
broader significance. Demonic visitations, eruptions of local powers, are no 
longer mere community revitalizations. They are partisan reminders that the 
heterodox majority (in some places, minority) will not be sidelined.
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Conclusion
‘Though, from the centre it never seems so, most of Java is far from the kra-
ton’, writes Ron Hatley (1984:15). The ethnography of Java is a recent affair 
– systematic fieldwork by anthropologists goes back only a generation – and 
the scope of variation has not been adequately charted. But distance can be 
social as well as geographical; the view from the bottom is not the same as 
the view from the top. Historians of Java routinely comment that elite culture 
should not be taken as a guide to local practice. But the working assumption 
is that, lacking evidence to the contrary, what goes in the court – with obvious 
modifications – goes in the village. It would be fairer to accept that dynastic 
histories and the literature of the courts cannot provide a reliable basis from 
which to generalize about popular belief and practice in the past, even where 
the literature (for example, the Centhini) takes popular culture as its subject 
(Ricklefs 2006:196). Even in the 1990s, I found that Banyuwangi’s intelligen-
tsia – the local experts on arts, history and custom – knew little of the sociol-
ogy of the village or the complexity and variety of belief and practice. When 
I described syncretic rituals I had witnessed they listened with polite incre-
dulity; when I told them of slametan in the village of Bomo attended by both 
Hindus and Muslims, they declared this to be impossible. Anthropologists 
will be familiar with this reaction. The intricate compromises of village life in 
Java, the myriad usages that find no official expression, cannot be captured in 
a visit or an interview: they can be known only through patient long-term fa-
miliarity and participant observation. If ‘expertise’ falters before the living re-
ality, in dealing with the historical record the gap between official knowledge 
and local practice must be far wider. In truth, we simply do not know what 
the mass of Javanese thought or did in earlier periods or to what extent they 
conformed to the Great Tradition of the courts. And the further from the po-
litical centre the stronger must be this conclusion. As the example of Banyu-
wangi shows, it would be a safer bet to assume that village ideas and practices 
– answering, as they do, to quite different structures and needs – are not and 
probably never have been like those of the centre. Where they appear similar, 
through incorporation into larger ritual frames or through adaptations of elite 
styles, other practices persist in their shadow, contradicting, parodying, com-
plementing, or merely differing from the dominant mode. Suzanne Brenner 
has commented that writers on Javanese concepts of power have tended to 
confirm ‘ideologies of the centre’, by which she means the formally superior, 
male perspective. Instead, she argues, ‘attention to peripheral discourses may 
reveal fundamental views of women’s and men’s natures that bypass or re-
configure the idioms of potency and prestige’ (Brenner 1995:42). My concern 
in this essay has not been gender, but my strategy has been somewhat similar. 
There is more to Java than the lamp reveals. 
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